School Governance: undemocratic institutions in a democratic society
Public companies, traded on the stock exchanges, have evolved into having an established and legal framework of governance. They are run by boards that are answerable to the owners of the company, the shareholders, who are able to remove them. This accountability extends throughout the company as all members of the executive management report to the company’s principal executive, the Chief Executive officer who in turn reports to the Chair, acting on behalf of the board. The board itself may have directors representing some shareholders’ interests as well as specialist directors related to the company’s expertise. It may also have non-executive directors who these days have an expanded role in the policing of companies, making sure that good, legal practice is followed.
No system is perfect of course but with the aim of accountability to the shareholders, such companies follow what should be an abiding principle, that institutions in a democratic society, as far as possible, should themselves be democratic.
The ‘stakeholder’ model of English Schools seems to be similar to the company shareholder model. Stakeholders, who have an interest in the school, can be seen as analogous to the shareholder of a company. Schools have boards, with members traditionally called governors rather than directors, and like companies there is a chair of the board. The school head is equivalent to the chief executive officer and reports to the chair representing the school board, and the school management team is equivalent to a company’s executive management. The workforce of a company is represented by the teachers and administrative staff in schools. There’s even what might be termed an analogous ‘bottom line’ whereby the measure of a company’s success is its profitability, and schools have exam results to measure their relative success. However in both cases these would hardly be seen as the only measure of success.
The shareholders of a company make the business world a very responsive environment. Communication between the company and its shareholders is maintained by press announcements, shareholder meetings or board meetings, where some directors may represent large stakes or a large number of shareholders in the company. The analogous stakeholder model could therefore be seen as important for schools if it delivers the same responsiveness. With the function of teaching children from a vulnerable and susceptible age with the potential dangers that entails both physically and mentally, it’s imperative to use a system that can quickly and appropriately respond. However, there are a number of important reasons why the stakeholder model fails to do this, and why the comparison to industry’s shareholder model may be more to do with the common language used rather than a functional similarity.
For a start, the English school system is rather fragmented. There are a number of school types, with different historical origins and differing forms of governance. Education is state funded without charge to over 90% of pupils, and education policy is a central government function. Voluntary Aided and Voluntary controlled schools are generally faith schools where the former, by contributing 10% of the running costs, have more powers in the running of the school than the wholly state funded (via the local education authority) Voluntary controlled schools. Community schools and foundation schools comprise over 75% of state funded primary and secondary schools in England and Wales. The major difference between the two is that in foundation schools the governing body have responsibility for staff recruitment and admissions and either they, or a trust, own the school buildings and land. In a community school, the above functions are the responsibility of the local education authority (LEA) which also owns the property. Poorly performing community schools were replaced by part-privately sponsored Academies in economically socially deprived areas. These were still majority state funded but bypassed the local education authority. They were given a higher degree of autonomy and accountability with sponsors ranging from private schools to philanthropists. The latest incarnation of these academies are called free schools and any successful community schools are being urged to become free schools.
Unlike the easy identification of the shareholders in the corporate world, in education it’s not quite so clear-cut who the stakeholders actually are. The government is paying for state education out of taxes. The Department for Education is responsible for state schools in England, with the LEA’s distributing the funds to the schools. The LEA’s have other administrative responsibilities depending on the type of school. None of the above parties, including the general taxpayer, has enough personal involvement to feel much of a loss should a particular school fail. Perhaps because this seems like an unusual case of responsibility without power, it could be strongly argued that school boards aren’t directly accountable to anyone.
It’s much more difficult to remove boards and board members in schools than in public companies. The situation in Birmingham is a case in point where Muslim extremists infiltrated school boards to impose an “intolerant and aggressive Islamic ethos” on pupils. The former’s removal for what seemed an obvious disqualification was anything but straightforward. Direct government action can be used, with the Secretary of state for education having the powers to remove school boards or their funding, but this is not commonly enacted. In fact it appears that the only group to be substantially affected by a failing school are the taxpaying parents or guardians of the current pupils. These are therefore the stakeholders and are equivalent to a company’s shareholders. The parents and guardians would need to be fully appraised of their responsibilities, but there should be straightforward procedures for them to remove the board. This would certainly act as an incentive to improve school boards, and very few would doubt that they need improving.
Governors are part-time and there are frequent backlogs in those undoubtedly serious issues specifically delegated to a particular board member, like for example complaints by teachers against members of the management team. The excuse of time constraints in balancing a school governor’s full-time job with their part- time school board responsibilities is frequently given. However, teachers must wonder why their important issues as professionals are dealt with by amateurs, and frequently in an amateurish way. Inconsistencies and conflicts of interest abound. It’s by no means unusual for appeals against board decisions to actually go through the board rather than an independent assessor. Minutes taken at board meetings or at executive level, for example in dealing with disciplinary hearings, are frequently taken by employees directly responsible to the head, meaning a whole raft of potential issues could be compromised. For example, if a situation arises where in an academically successful school, the head is behaving entirely inappropriately either to pupils or staff, then such systemic weaknesses could significantly delay their removal.
Further, board members, on many issues, can be limited to the role of advisors to the chair, so that even with a representative of a teachers’ union and of the parents on the board, it can still be run autocratically. This can insidiously lower board morale. Without any real accountability or disincentives for average or poor performance, there has anyway always been the suspicion that the most important reason for a potential board member wanting to be elected is for the kudos they receive. As such, school board membership has long been looked upon as a privilege rather than an important function.
It’s easy to see why such a state of affairs has evolved and been maintained. The over-emphasis on exam results has meant that if a school performs adequately, it seems to imply the system also performs in the same way. However, even when exam results are poor and the school has been deemed a failure, there must have been a time where the results were adequate but the seeds of failure were working their way through. To identify when this happens, notwithstanding the difficulty with natural differences in each academic cohort, must be preferable to acting precipitously. Good governance, honed by accountability would seem to have an important role to play.
It’s difficult to see how the academies or their latest incarnation, the free schools, will improve school governance. They do at least dispense with another government tier below the Department of Education, the LEA, whose function appears administrative with no real power. And besides, the LEA’s aren’t local enough. The academy’s trust is at least accountable for the school, and they may (only ‘may’) set up either a local governing body or advisory body, which would be equivalent to the school board. The presence of such a board – or body – would seem essential if the (multi academy) trust has more than one school under its umbrella. But this system, as well as just replacing the removed LEA layer, seems to leave little room for accountability to the genuine stakeholders, the parents or guardians of children at the school. Power rests with an even stronger board, even more removed from the school.
It seems strange that with an increasing number of different types of schools in the publically-funded sector, a more consistent and responsive form of school governance, accountable to the right people and based on sound democratic principles, hasn’t been a priority. Good governance could ultimately make more of a difference than the type of school. The attainment of good examination results shouldn’t be the only measure of the health of a school or indeed the current system, particularly if there’s no other way of recognising if those good results can’t be maintained.
So the burning question of the day is: are English school boards fit for purpose?
